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CROSS-EXAMINING FILM
JESSICA SILBEY*
In the recent Supreme Court case, Scott v. Harris,' the Court
fell for a trick that has seduced moviegoers for more than a century: it
treated film as a depiction of reality. The Court held that a Georgia
police officer did not violate a fleeing suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights when the officer intentionally caused a car crash, rendering the
suspect a quadriplegic. 2 The Court's decision relied almost entirely on
the film of the high-speed police chase taken from a "dash-cam," a
video camera mounted on the dashboard of the pursuing police
cruiser.
3
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has acted as film
critic in determining the scope of constitutional protection.4 The
Justices once routinely viewed obscene films to determine whether
they conflicted with contemporary community standards.5 This may,
however, be the first time that the Supreme Court disregarded all other
evidence and declared the film version of the disputed events as the
unassailable truth. Indeed, the Supreme Court said that, in light of the
contrary stories told by the opposing parties in the lawsuit, the only
story to be believed was the one the video told: "We are happy to
allow the videotape to speak for itself.",6 And, for the first time in
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1. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
2. Id. at 1773, 1779.
3. See id. at 1775.
4. See generally Jessica Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic
Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 496 (2004) (describing problems and contradictions
that occur when judges act as film critics when determining the admissibility and weight of
film evidence) [hereinafter Judges as Film Critics].
5. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-30 (1973) (discussing the evolution of the
standards that the Court employs when reviewing obscenity cases).
6. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5.
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history, the Su7preme Court linked video evidence to the slip opinion
on its website.
In Scott v. Harris, the Court fell victim to the widespread and
dangerous belief-to the degree of enshrining this belief in our
national jurisprudence-that film captures reality. As Justice Breyer
stated at oral argument, seemingly flabbergasted by the contrary
findings below: "I see with my eyes ... what happened, what am I
supposed to do?"8
The Supreme Court is not the first court to fall prey to the
persuasive power of film. It is typical for courts and advocates to
naively treat filmic evidence as a transparent window revealing the
whole truth-a presentation of unambiguous reality.9 Consider the
impetus behind the trends in policing which form the factual basis of
the Scott case, including the practice of filming crime scenes, police
stops, interrogations, and confessions. Police use these video
recordings to demonstrate what happened free from any questions of
bias or misrepresentation: what was said, whether statements were
voluntary, whether the police acted on the basis of probable cause,
"who dunnit," and why. 10 From this perspective, the police cruiser's
dash-cam captured the whole story-the only story-of the car chase
and the circumstances surrounding the policeman's use of force.
However, film is a constructed medium.'1 The camera always
presents a certain point of view and a frame that includes some images
and excludes others. Films are depicted in artificial light and color.
From the earliest emergence of film technology, filmmakers and critics
recognized that the appearance of reality in films is an illusion based
upon conventions of representation, much like the convention of
perspective in two-dimensional drawings or the conventions of light
and dark in oil paintings.1 2 These conventions produce images that
resemble and represent reality, but are not reality in fact.
7. See Scott v. Harris, No. 05-1631, (U.S. Apr. 30, 2007), available at
http ://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions.
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-
163 1) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter in the
8-1 decision, and the only Justice who recognized that the film was not the whole story. Scott,
127 S. Ct. at 1781-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. See Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 506.
10. See Jessica Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre of
Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107, 116 (2005) (observing that film is
increasingly being used as a policing tool to monitor police and suspect interactions because it
appears to provide an objective and unambiguous representation of past events) [hereinafter
Filmmaking in the Precinct House].
11. See infra Part II.
12. Id.
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Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter in Scott v. Harris, articulated
this concept when he faulted the majority for disregarding the lower
court's factual findings that were based on all the evidence-more
evidence than just the dash-cam video.' 3 Indeed, Justice Stevens did
what many astute film critics do: he noted that the film's portrayal of
the event was only one possible version of what happened.' 4 Justice
Stevens recognized that a filmic representation of events is monocular,
but the chase itself-and the reality of the event that is at the heart of
the adjudicatory proceeding-is, by its nature, multi-ocular. Justice
Stevens understood that film, no matter its form or genre, cannot
convey the whole story and should not replace the search for that story
in a court of law. A court must consider the many points of view on
the disputed event when deciding whether there is a material dispute of
fact sufficient to justify sending a case to a jury, not just the filmic
version of the story. 15
How could Mr. Scott have countered the weight of the film and
its persuasive power? How can advocates counter and undermine
seemingly infallible filmic evidence? Advocates must cross-examine
films the way they cross-examine witnesses. And because films are
assertive in nature,' 6 advocates should treat films in the same way they
treat other testimonial evidence: critically and with careful scrutiny.
Although the lower court decided Scott v. Harris on summary
judgment, the kind of examination this article proposes could take
place when debating the merits of a motion to strike evidence
submitted as part of the record on summary judgment rather than at
trial, during cross-examination, or pretrial in the form of motions in
limine. This article will set forth examination techniques using a piece
of filmic evidence from Patric v. Austin17 as an example. Courts and
advocates can use this article as a resource for understanding how to
critically assess and evaluate filmic evidence.
13. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. See id. See also Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 570.
15. Among other things, Justice Stevens points to the fact that the film obscures the
portion of the car chase that took place on a four-lane highway, not a two-lane highway. This
would affect the "dangerousness" element of the legal inquiry. He also explains how the film's
distance from traffic lights makes it difficult to discern the color of the signals, also relevant to
dangerousness. He then complains that the court minimizes the significance of the police
sirens because the sound recording on the film was low, possibly because of soundproofing in
the officer's vehicle. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 500, 508 n.62.
17. Patric v. Austin, No. A-05-CA-022-AWA, 2006 WL 5266759, slip op. (W.D. Tex.
February 14, 2006) (a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Austin police officers for
excessive use of force, among other claims, in which the parties used video from the dash-cam
of a police cruiser as evidence at trial).
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Part I provides a brief background on film and describes the
wide array of films that have been used as evidence. 18 This section
debunks the following three myths about film as evidence: (1) film is
objective and unbiased; 19 (2) its meaning is unambiguous and
obvious; 20 and (3) film transforms a viewer into an eyewitness. 2' Part
II discusses the case of Patric v. Austin, a civil rights lawsuit against
the police where both sides used a video of the arrest as evidence.
22
This section describes how both parties used the video evidence to
validate their version of the events. Using the Patric film, Part II will
also: (1) discuss the pros and cons of using film evidence; (2) use
examination techniques to demonstrate that every film can tell more
than one story and less than the whole story; and (3) employ various
examination methods to show that every film suffers from ambiguity.
23
Part III will demonstrate how advocates can adapt traditional cross-
examination techniques to the unique challenges of film evidence.
24
Finally, the article concludes with a comprehensive set of questions for
advocates, judges, or fact-finders to use when considering introducing
or accepting film evidence.
25
I. FILMIC EVIDENCE AND FILM FORM
A. Typologies of Filmic Evidence
Filmic evidence comes in a wide variety of genres. The
category of filmic evidence I call evidence verit6 purports to be
unmediated and unself-conscious film footage of actual events.26 For
example, surveillance film is a common form of evidence verit.
Surveillance film might be taken by a private investigator, an
automated device (e.g., ATM machine or toll booth cameras), or might
originate from a mounted camera on a police car, as in Scott v. Harris.
Surveillance footage is in real time, unedited, and not narrated.
18. See infra Part I.
19. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 111, 127; Judges as Film
Critics, supra note 4, at 508.
20. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 111-12; Judges as Film
Critics, supra note 4, at 508-09.
21. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 124-25; Judges as Film
Critics, supra note 4, at 519 & n.1 15.
22. See infra Part II.
23. Id.
24. See infra Part 1lI.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 507, 515-20.
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Another kind of evidence verit6 is after-the-fact crime footage, such as
film of an interrogation, a criminal confession, or a crime scene.27
These films are also in real time, but are less serendipitous and more
deliberate. The camera records evidence that criminals leave behind or
create with their confessions rather than catching them in the act of
committing crimes.28 Unlike serendipitous surveillance film, films of
crime scenes or interrogations may be narrated, if not throughout the
film, then at the beginning and the end.
Beyond evidence verit6, there are other types of filmic
evidence that are more obviously staged and scripted, such as day-in-
the-life films and videotaped expert reenactments. 29 These kinds of
films differ in important ways from evidence verit. For example, they
are usually rehearsed, produced, and edited in order to control the
interpretation of the images on film.30 The production process might
use special camera lenses and filters; the editing process also involves
cutting and splicing, which produces outtakes. These films are self-
conscious performances made with trial in mind, most often after a
lawsuit has already been filed.3 1 They are quite clearly advocative and
testimonial, and yet these types of films often disarm opponents and
undermine the power of cross-examination that is so critical to our
adjudicative process.
With fast-paced technological change, the forms of filmic
evidence are rapidly expanding. For example, advocates now use
images from diagnostic imaging devices as evidence at trial that
purport to illustrate, at a desirable level of scientific exactitude, various
types of motion or objects inside the body. 32 These devices include
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI), Computed Axial Tomography (CAT scans), and
27. See id. at 509-15 (analyzing the effects of after-the-fact crime films by using two
cases in which after-the-fact footage played a role in obtaining criminal convictions). See also
Jessica Silbey, Criminal Performances: Film, Autobiography and Confession, 37 N.M. L. REV.
189, 218-40 (2007) (discussing the use of criminal confessions as evidence verit ) [hereinafter
Criminal Performances].
28. See id. at 194-97 (criticizing the use of filmed confessions as evidence of
voluntariness, truthfulness, or as a means of dissuading police from using coercive
interrogation tactics).
29. Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 520-21.
30. Id. at 520.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the
Admissibility and Persuasiveness offMRI, 2 INT'L J.L. IN CONTEXT 233 (2006) (discussing the
nature and value of fMRI as evidence of mental states and capabilities and the likelihood of its
admissibility in court).
2008]
22 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:17
Positron Emission Tomography (PET scans).33  Similarly, the
prevalence of digital film is increasing throughout our culture as more
people carry a camera of some kind-whether in a phone, laptop, or
daily planner. 34 This trend increases the likelihood that filmic evidence
will appear in today's courtrooms.
35
Applying the rules of evidence to these varied and changing
genres of film can be a challenging endeavor. With the emergence of
new kinds of evidence, the judicial system must either create new rules
of evidence or find new applications for old rules. So far, many courts
and advocates are forced into the latter tack, trying to fit these new
film forms into old evidence categories. They analogize film to
demonstratives, such as chalks or illustrations, or treat film as
substantive evidence without conducting sophisticated analyses of the
probative value or prejudice inherent in filmic evidence. 36 Frequently,
courts and advocates muddle the evaluation of film as evidence and
reinforce troublesome myths about film and its relationship to reality
and truth. These are myths that filmmakers and film historians have
33. See Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the
Image: An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171,
176-82 (2007).
34. See, Katie Hafner, Film Drop-Off Sites Fading Fast As Digital Cameras Dominate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at CI available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/
business/09film.html. Moreover, serendipitous film footage of citizen encounters with police
abounds. A simple search of the website YouTube.com turns up hundreds of police videos.
See YouTube.com home page, http://www.youtube.com. For example, in Jones v. City of
Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2008) the court, on a motion to dismiss,
disregarded footage from a police cruiser's dash-cam that captured the arrest of Nathaniel
Jones, but the film is on YouTube.com. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-o3-MrFOLXFs.
See also Press Release, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, Investigation into the Death
of Victoria Snelgrove (September 12, 2005), available at http://www.mass.gov/
dasuffolk/docs/091205a.html (noting the use of video footage in an investigation of an
incident in which a Boston Red Sox fan died after police shot her with rubber pellets).
35. There is a now a field called digital forensics which is devoted to the determination
of whether and how digital photographs and films (among other types of digital media) have
been altered. See Brian D. Carrier, Basic Digital Forensic Investigation Concepts (June 7,
2006), http://www.digital-evidence.org/di-basics.html; see also Claudia Dreifus, A
Conversation With Hany Farid: Proving that Seeing Shouldn't Always be Believing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at F2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/science/
02conv.html (describing the digital forensics field within computer science); Susan Llewelyn
Leach, Seeing is No Longer Believing, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2005, at 15, available
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0202/pl5s02-lire.html (discussing the ethical concerns
with manipulating photographs).
36. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the
Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 65 (1998) (noting that as of the early 1990s,
photography "hovered uncomfortably on the boundary between illustration and proof').
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long rejected, such as: (1) film's objectivity; 37 (2) film's lack of
ambiguity; 38 and (3) film's witnessing function.39
Filmic evidence may be offered as demonstrative evidence to
illustrate verbal testimony or as substantive evidence that by itself
tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. 4 1 Demonstrative evidence
"is premised upon the theory that it is easier and much more effective
simply to show the jurors what is being described, rather than to waste
time and to risk possible confusion by relying solely upon oral
testimony. ' 42 Common examples are diagrams and charts, 43 but
photographs and films fit the category of demonstrative evidence as
well. Substantive filmic evidence-through its representation of
events, places, and people-asserts the existence or nonexistence of
certain facts.44 Film is particularly persuasive in making such
assertions because of its apparent indexical relationship to reality.
45
When we watch film, we trust that it is capturing an event, place, or
person as filmed. Indeed, to admit film into evidence, the evidentiary
authentication doctrine requires that a witness testify as to whether the
film is a fair and accurate portrayal of the thing it purports to
represent.46
37. See Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 111, 127 and Judges as
Film Critics, supra note 4, at 508. In their excellent treatise on evidence, Christopher Mueller
and Laird Kirkpatrick call attention to the fact that all photographic evidence creates a risk of
prejudice because images may be "unnecessarily gruesome, inflammatory, or otherwise
unfairly prejudicial," and caution that modem technology makes it possible to "manipulate,
distort, and fabricate all forms of photographic imagery." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 9.14 (3rd ed. 2003). They do not, however, discuss the
limitations inherent in the use of film and video as evidence, even where it is not inflammatory
and has not been intentionally manipulated to create a distortion.
38. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 111; Judges as Film Critics,
supra note 4, at 508-09.
39. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 124; Judges as Film Critics,
supra note 4, at 519;
40. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004).
41. See FED. R. EVID. 401. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining substantive evidence as that which is "offered to help establish a fact in issue").
42. Melvin Belli, Demonstrative Evidence: Seeing is Believing, 16 TRIAL 70, 71 (July
1980) (quoting Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 503).
43. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (2004) (defining demonstrative evidence as
evidence that may include an explanatory aid, such as a chart or a map).
44. See Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 570 (describing filmic evidence as
"assertive and accountable").
45. ANDRt BAZIN, WHAT Is CINEMA? 21 (Hugh Gray ed. & trans., University of
California Press 2005) (1967) (describing the ontological relationship between film and the
thing or event filmed).
46. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(1).
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There is, however, an important distinction between
demonstrative evidence and substantive evidence. Demonstrative
evidence is not actually admitted into evidence and does not go into
the jury room during deliberations.47 The trial judge might instruct the
jury that demonstrative evidence is merely an aid to understanding the
oral testimony connected to the film, but is not itself evidence in the
case. Substantive evidence, on the other hand, is formally admitted and
is ordinarily available to the jury during deliberations. 8 If the judge
admits the film as substantive evidence, it may be considered with all
other evidence as proof of the existence or non-existence of relevant
facts. 49 One may wonder, of course, whether jurors understand or pay
any attention to such nuanced instructions distinguishing
demonstrative from substantive evidence, especially when a film is the
object of the instruction. As a practical matter, regardless of whether a
film is shown merely as a demonstrative aid or as substantive
evidence, it can be expected to have a powerful impact on jurors.
Treating film as substantive evidence as opposed to a
demonstrative aid would recognize film's assertive nature. This would
be a step in the right direction because assertive proffers of evidence
are routinely tested for their accuracy and bias through cross-
examination. However, most courts and advocates appear to believe
that what they see on film is perfectly clear (unambiguous as to its
meaning) 50 and unbiased (the film does not lie or present prejudices). 51
These assumptions render any further examination unnecessary. Scott
v. Harris demonstrates this phenomenon: eight of the nine Supreme
Court Justices determined that the police video unambiguously and
objectively demonstrated the absence of unreasonable force, despite a
variety of substantive evidence to the contrary. 52 Indeed, the Court
stated that the video was the best evidence of the reasonableness of the
use of force: the facts of the case were considered "in the light
depicted by the videotape," 53 and "summary judgment became
47. Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative
Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 959, 960 n.7 (1992)
(discussing the historical and theoretical use of demonstrative evidence in law).
48. Nancy Hollander & Barbara Bergman, Specific Evidentiary Issues, in EVERYTRIAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE RESOURCE BOOK § 48:1 (2008).
49. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (8th ed. 2004).
50. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 11; Judges as Film Critics,
supra note 4, at 516.
51. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at I 11; Judges as Film Critics,
supra note 4, at 508.
52. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1781-82 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the lower court made its decision after examining all substantive evidence).
53. Id. at 1776 (majority opinion).
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appropriate because a rational jury only could accept the singular,
unambiguous version of events presented in the video."54
Film can be so persuasive that some cases and treatises say that
film "speaks for itself," a conclusion with which the Supreme Court
now appears to agree. 55 Commentators call this the "silent witness
theory" of photographic or filmic evidence. 56 The theory that a film
operates as a "silent witness" is most prevalent when the evidence
comes from an automatic camera, like film from unobtrusive
surveillance cameras. In Scott v. Harris, the Court treated the film as
representing the events so obviously and with such unimpeachable
trustworthiness that the film effectively transformed viewers into
eyewitnesses. This theory enables judges and fact-finders to feel as if
they are seeing the disputed event with their own eyes and, therefore,
are free to draw their own conclusions from the film without
considering other witnesses or evidence.
57
B. A Critical History of Film Form
Filmic evidence is not an unambiguous representation of
events; by its very nature, film has multiple meanings. So too, film
images are not unbiased; rather, they represent one point of view to the
exclusion of all others. This means that film viewers are not
transformed into eyewitnesses to the event the film represents; instead,
the viewer sees only one particular representation of one portion of an
54. Id. For an excellent and concise essay on the failings of Scott v. Harris and its
application of the standard at summary judgment, see Howard Wasserman, Video Evidence
and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 181 (Jan.-
Feb. 2008).
55. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5. This has elsewhere been called the "silent witness
theory" which dictates that photographic and filmic evidence speaks for itself independent of a
sponsoring witness. 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 790 n.4 (1970) (noting that as early as 1897,
judges have believed that the best evidence is a photograph or other representative evidence).
See also State v. Pulphus, 465 A.2d 153. 158 (R.I. 1983) (holding that a witness "need not
testify that the photograph accurately represents what he observed; the photograph, once
properly admitted, 'speaks for itself").
56. See Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 54. See generally Steven I. Bergel,
Comment, "Silent Witness Theory" Adopted to Admit Photographs Without Percipient
Witness Testimony, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353 (1985) (describing various courts' applications
of the silent witness theory); James McNeal, Silent Witness Evidence In Relation to the
Illustrative Evidence Foundation, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 219 (1984) (describing the silent witness
theory within the context of other categories of evidence).
57. Judges as Film Critics, supra note 4, at 519. See also Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 8; Claire Duffett, The Double Edge of Digital Video at Trial, LAW TECHNOLOGY
NEWS, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/
pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1204113035617 (quoting a practitioner who states that films "almost
make [the jury] a witness to what takes place").
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event. With these limitations in mind, the film's assertive message-
the story it tells-must be critically evaluated and tested. Indeed, as
the discussion in Part II demonstrates, film's assertive character
presents the same types of testimonial risks that traditional hearsay
restrictions attempt to minimize: perception, ambiguity and sincerity.
For these reasons, film evidence requires the same cross-examination
as a percipient witness to test its truth and accuracy, especially in light
of film's powerful persuasive value.
The history of film and filmmaking demonstrates that film is an
art form that reconstitutes experience through the play of light and
dark, and other mechanisms of filmmaking. This history directly
contradicts the perception of film as objective and unambiguous, and
substantiates the necessity for critically evaluating this type of
evidence.
1. The Illusory Witness
From its beginning, film has been understood as phantasmal
and rhetorical. It has an apparent capacity to reveal the world, but this
is an illusion; its objective, transparent quality is the source of its
persuasive power, or what some call the "myth of total cinema.,
59
The guiding myth, then, inspiring the invention of
cinema, is the accomplishment of that which dominated
in a more or less vague fashion all the techniques of the
mechanical reproduction of reality in the nineteenth
century, from photography to the phonograph, namely
an integral realism, a recreation of the world in its own
image, an image unburdened by the freedom of
interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time.
60
The "myth of total cinema" is that film reproduces reality in
front of viewers' eyes.61 Film makes spectators feel as though they are
witnessing the event or object as the event or object existed when
filmed. However, film re-presents the event or object as something
never before seen.
58. See FED. R. EVlD. 801 Advisory Committee's note. ("The factors to be considered in
evaluating the testimony of a witness are perception, memory, and narration. Sometimes a
fourth is added, sincerity.")
59. BAZIN, supra note 45, at 17.
60. Id. at 21.
61. See id. at 17.
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The first film genre played with the myth that film transforms
viewers into witnesses. Named "actualities," these short films
purported to document some lived experience. 62 This is the genre that
spawned documentaries. 63 The first of these films that played to a
movie theater audience was L 'arrivee d'un train en gare de La Ciotat
(The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat).64 This film did what its title
purported to do: it showed a train arriving in the station at La Ciotat.
The camera was stationed on the quay such that the train grew larger
and larger on screen as it got closer to the station. Upon showing this
film at the Grand Caf6 in Paris in 1895, the audience members
reportedly screamed and ran from the theater, afraid the train was
going to run them down.65 Unaccustomed to the illusion of reality in
motion that film creates, the audience members feared for their lives
and never saw the end of the film. 66 The filmmakers ofL 'arrivee d'un
train en gare de La Ciotat played with the audience's expectations,
expectations which remain part of the movie-going experience today.
Film's mimetic quality of lived experience provides the audience with
the pleasure of playing the role of witness to some event that feels live
before them but which is, in fact, merely projected on a screen. The
audience's pleasure (both voyeuristic and based on the perceived
acquisition of knowledge) persists regardless of whether the event
portrayed occurred as the film represents it.
67
Less than a decade later, Edwin Porter created The Great Train
Robbery.68 This film is credited as the first pseudo-documentary: a
documentary on how to rob a train. 69 With the popularity of this film
came the fear and hope, unabated today, that film is powerfully
explanatory and can show viewers the truth about an aspect of life of
which they have no personal knowledge. Many pseudo-documentaries
followed, including Flaherty's Nanook of the North,70 Dziga Vertov's
62. DAVID BORDWELL, ON THE HISTORY OF FILM STYLE 13 (Harvard University Press
1997).
63. See BILL NICHOLS, INTRODUCTION To DOCUMENTARY 83 (Indiana University Press
2001).
64. GERALD MAST & BRUCE F. KAWIN, THE MOVIES: A SHORT HISTORY 22 (Allyn &
Bacon 1996); L'ARRIVE D'UN TRAIN EN GARE DE LA CIOTAT (Lumi&re 1895).
65. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. See generally LAURA MULVEY, VISUAL AND OTHER PLEASURES (Indiana University
Press 1989).
68. THE GREAT TRAIN ROBBERY (Thomas A. Edison, Inc. 1903).
69. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 64, at 42.
70. NANOOK OF THE NORTH (Revillon Fr~res 1922) (documenting the daily life of an
Inuit man); see Louis Menand, Nanook and Me "Fahrenheit 9/11" and the Documentary
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newsreel montages, 71 and Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will.72
Some categorize the films of Michael Moore and Errol Morris in this
genre as well. 73 These pseudo-documentaries demonstrate that all
films operate as a form of rhetoric and aim to persuade. All film is
fiction. It is shaped, feigned, and created.74 Therefore, its relationship
to reality must be critically interrogated, especially if the film will be
used as evidence upon which a legal judgment will be based.
2. The Grammar of Film
Another contribution The Great Train Robbery made to film
form stemmed from the structure of its editing. Porter taught us that by
juxtaposing shots of dtherwise discontinuous images, the filmmaker
creates logic where none existed before.75 This is called montage, a
principle exemplified by the famous experiments that filmmaker Lev
Kuleshov conducted in the 1920s using students from the Moscow
Film School.76 These experiments demonstrated that the meaning of a
single shot changes dramatically depending on the images that frame
it. 7 In the experiments, Kuleshov juxtaposed the same image of a
man's face with, alternatively, a bowl of soup, a corpse in a coffin, and
a child playing. To the audience viewing the edited film, the actor
portrayed a different emotion in each of these scenes.78 When the
man's face was juxtaposed with the image of the coffin, the audience
reported that the man appeared deeply sorrowful.7 9 Yet when the same
face was juxtaposed with the image of the soup, the audience reported
that the man appeared to be hungry. 80 When next to the child, the
Tradition, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 2004, at 90-92 (comparing the origins of documentary
film with the contemporary resurgence of the genre).
71. CHELOVEK S KINO-APPARATON [MAN WITH A MOVIE CAMERA] (VUFKU 1929)
(documenting the daily lives of citizens in Soviet cities); see also Vlada Petric, Cinematic
Abstraction as a Means of Conveying Ideological Messages in The Man with the Movie
Camera in THE RED SCREEN: POLITICS, SOCIETY, ART IN SOVIET CINEMA 90 (Anna Lawton ed.,
Routledge 1992).
72. TRIUMPH DES WILLENS [TRIUMPH OF THE WILL] (Leni Riefenstahl-Produktion 1935)
(documenting the Nazi party's 1934 Congress at Nuremberg).
73. Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 10, at 109, 111 and accompanying
notes.
74. "Fiction" is from the latin fictio, meaning "a making, counterfeiting," and fingere,
meaning "to form, mold." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 502 (3d ed. 1996).
75. BORDWELL, supra note 62, at 13.
76. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 64, at 176.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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audience perceived the man as joyful. 81 Therefore, the same image can
mean different things depending upon its relationship to the shots
before and after it: "Editing alone had created the scenes, their
emotional content and meaning...." 82 This established one of the
most important tenets of film editing: the human tendency to create
relationships and imagine connections between otherwise unrelated
scenes. 83 In other words, audiences perceive a narrative where none
existed before.
Other than montage, film creates meaning by manipulating the
camera's perspective (angles) and breadth of view (wide shots and
focus). Film director D.W. Griffith, the early American director and
initial master of this kind of film language, engineered the close-up,
deep focus, long shot, pan shot and traveling shot. 84
Griffith had learned.. . [that] films were capable of
mirroring not only physical activities but mental
processes. Films could recreate the activities of the
mind: the focusing of attention on one object or another
(by means of a close up), the recalling of memories or
projecting of imaginings (by means of a flashback or
forward), the division of interest (by means of the
cross-cut).85
By using the camera's movement to mimic the mind's eye,
Griffith's techniques are especially effective in blurring the camera's
recreation of some event in the past with the audience's perception that
it is witnessing some event in the present.
3. Film Bias
All films have a point of view or voice, whether conscious or
mechanical. There is always a filmmaker or a camera operator whose
perspective is captured on film while other perspectives are excluded:
"The documentarist, like any communicator in any medium, makes
endless choices. He ... selects topics, people, vistas, angles, lens,
juxtapositions, sounds, words. Each selection is an expression of his
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. BORDWELL, supra note 62, at 34.
84. Id. at 13-14; see also MAST & KAWlN, supra note 64, at 57-58.
85. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 64, at 54.
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point of view, whether he is aware of it or not, whether he
acknowledges it or not."
86
The stakes in shaping that voice are particularly high when the
voice is used in documentary films or evidence verit6. The inevitability
of a bias, a specific perspective that excludes others, provokes
significant epistemological uncertainties. For instance, all stories, even
true ones, can be told from different angles, with different morals and
objectives. Each version may be entirely truthful, but no single version
tells the whole story. Another epistemological uncertainty originates
from every film's demand that the film audience assess the authority
of the film voice-whether an implicit or explicit narrator-as
trustworthy or not.
When filmmakers developed a narrative point of view in films,
this mechanism helped popularize the art of film and added to its sense
of realism. First person narrative film developed in the 1920s and used
the embodiment of a single subject whose thoughts, directions, and
desires motivated the film. The first person narrative film form
capitalized on the capacity of films to create a sense of intimacy and
revelation by blurring the "boundary between subjective and objective
perceptions."87 It also perpetuated a sense of singularity and wholeness
in the viewing audience, adding to the sense that the audience was
seeing the events on screen live. However, early films also made clear
that knowing and seeing from that singular perspective was
problematic because that perspective wholly relied on the
trustworthiness of the storyteller. For example, the 1919 film, The
Cabinet of Doctor Caligari, typifies early first-person narrative film.
Throughout the film, the audience believes that the main character is
telling a tragic but true story. However, as the film progresses, it
becomes clear that the character was actually telling the audience a
deluded and paranoid fable from inside his suite at a mental
institution.8
9
Despite its capacity for distortion, the first-person narrative
film style flourished and formed the basis of classic Hollywood film
styles because it perpetuated the fantasy of the unique and central
86. STELLA BRUZZI, NEW DOCUMENTARY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4 (quoting ERIK
BARNOUW, DOCUMENTARY: A HISTORY OF THE NON-FICTION FILM 313 (Oxford University
Press 1983) (1974).
87. MAST & KAWIN, supra note 64, at 136.
88. DAS CABINET DES DR. CALIGARI [THE CABINET OF DR. CALIGARI] (Decla-Bioscop
AG 1920).
89. MAST& KAWIN, supra note 64, at 138.
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subject who legitimates or vouches for the film's meaning.90 But from
its inception, this genre questioned the falseness of film's omniscience
and transparency. This first-person narrative style has become so
ubiquitous that its irony is lost on most audiences today. Film makes
or designates its audience as centered and all-knowing when it is film
itself that constitutes and influences the perspective to which the
audience is subject.
4. Film's Self-Critique
Another hallmark of early film is its critique of its own mode
of representation. Early films drew attention to their constructed nature
by either manifesting their filmic qualities or breaking with the illusion
and drawing the audience into the creation of the film's story. George
Melies' The Magic Lantern,9 1 made in 1903, is often cited as the first
film about a film, telling the history of Western dramatic art by
showing first a landscape painting, then a play, and then an image of
the newly developed moving pictures.9 2 By placing film in the
trajectory of Western representational art, Melies' film explains that
film art is no more or less faithful to its subject than painting. This
recognition that the film's story is just one representational scheme
among others acknowledges the viewer's complicity in the
perpetuation of the illusion of film's omniscience. It became a
common practice in early films to tell stories about telling stories
through pictures. 93 Although now a ubiquitous and varied feature of
cinema-like in the film Adaptation94 or Hitchcock's classic Rear
Window95- film's early self-reflexive tendencies were another way of
commenting on its illusion of reality and providing a mode of
resistance to the -"myth of total cinema."
96
This resistance is all but lost when film is offered as evidence
in an adjudicative context. Film is not a mechanism for witnessing,
despite its prevalence in our surveillance society, which bombards us
90. ROBERT STAM, ROBERT BURGOYNE & SANDY FLITTERMAN-LEWIS, NEW
VOCABULARIES IN FILM SEMIOTICS: STRUCTURALISM, POST-STRUCTURALISM AND BEYOND 186-
87 (Routledge 1992).
91. LA LANTERNE MAGIQUE [THE MAGIC LANTERN] (Georges M6li~s 1903).
92. MAST & KAwN, supra note 64, at 31.
93. Id.
94. ADAPTATION (Beverly Detroit 2002).
95. REAR WINDOW (Paramount Pictures 1954). See generally Robert Stain & Roberta
Pearson, Hitchcock's Rear Window: Reflexivity and the Critique of Voyeurism, 7 ENCLITIC
136-45 (Spring 1983). See also ROBERT STAM, REFLEXIVITY IN FILM AND LITERATURE: FROM
DON QUIXOTE TO JEAN-Luc GODARD (Columbia University Press 1992).
96. BAZIN, supra note 45, at 17.
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with real-time images and information about the world through
cameras, television, and computers. The perception that film possesses
the capacity to wholly and truthfully reveal the world is a myth and
"an idealistic phenomenon ... as if in some platonic heaven."97 Film
no more reveals the world than it reconstructs the world. Like any
representational form, film requires an interpreter to analyze its
specific language and account for how it creates meaning. Given the
explosion of the variety and uses of film as evidence, contemporary
audiences of evidence verit6 must learn to analyze, critique and
interpret film as rhetoric and a craft, rather than as a window into an
unambiguous and objective truth.
II. PATRIC V. AUSTIN
9 8
The remainder of this article aims to help advocates transform
viewers' experience of film from one where viewers feel sure that they
know what they are seeing-the ideology of "seeing with my own
eyes"--to the experience of "the more I watch, the less sure I am of
what I see." Effecting this transformation will help debunk the myth
that film has the capacity for objective and unambiguous
representation. When advocates face filmic evidence that might hurt
their clients-whether a filmed confession or a day-in-the-life-of
film-they must be better equipped to dispel the false perceptions that
film is transparent, morally objective, and exposes the whole truth.
In 2004, actor Jason Patric was celebrating in Austin, Texas at
the wrap party for a movie he had been filming when police arrested
him outside of a bar for public intoxication and also charged him with
resisting arrest. Both charges were later dropped.99 During the arrest,
Patric suffered physical injuries and subsequently filed a civil rights
suit against Austin (the City) and the police. He alleged, among other
things, that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, used
excessive force when effecting the arrest, falsely arrested him, and
falsely imprisoned him.' 0
0
Unbeknownst to the arresting officers, a police camera
mounted on a nearby cruiser recorded the activity prior to the arrest
97. Id.
98. Patric v. Austin, No. A-05-CA-022-AWA, 2006 WL 5266759, slip op. (W.D. Tex.
February 14, 2006).
99. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at para. 17, Patric v. City of Austin, No. A-
05-CA-022-AWA, 2006 WL 5266759, slip op. (W.D. Tex. August 22, 2005).
100. Id. at para. 22.
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and the arrest itself.'0' The camera was in a fixed position throughout
the incident and was not tended or manipulated by any operator. Both
the plaintiff and the defendants used this evidence verit at trial.
10 2
Patric used the film to show that he was unlawfully arrested and
abused, and the City used the film to show that the police had probable
cause to arrest Patric. 1 3 The film is part of the public record in the
Western District of Texas.' 
04
The film shows a man trying to hail a cab from the middle of
the street while a group of people congregate on a corner sidewalk. It
then shows a police officer on a bicycle approach the man in the
crosswalk as more people join the group on the corner. Then the film
shows a tussle at the street corner, which is partially blocked by a
parked car, and another police officer dropping his bike and running
over to the crowd. The film records some talking and shouting that is
mostly inaudible. It also shows a police officer arresting a man in a
white shirt and walking him to the police car in handcuffs. All of this
activity is difficult to see because it takes place in the background of
the film and is out of focus. After several playbacks, viewers can
follow the man with the white shirt, Jason Patric, as he walks down the
sidewalk on the right side of the film frame and can see that he moves
into the street in the background to talk to the man hailing the cab. He
then walks out of the street to the street corner and is arrested shortly
thereafter. 1
05
Both parties used the film at trial as evidence to determine,
among other things, whether Patric was drunk and belligerent, whether
he disobeyed the police when they asked him to get out of the street,
whether they told him he was under arrest, and whether they threw
him to the ground unnecessarily after he allegedly resisted arrest. 106 To
the plaintiffs, the film showed that the police unlawfully handled
Patric. To the defendants, it showed the police officers doing their job.
Each party used the same film at trial to prove its point and, as such,
this case exemplifies the trouble with filmic evidence.
101. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 33, Patric v. Austin, No. A-05-CA-022-AWA,
2006 WL 5266759, slip op. (W.D. Tex. February 14, 2006) [hereinafter Patric v. Austin
Transcript] (Trial Transcripts from February 14, 15 and 16, 2006 are on file with author).
102. See id. at 45 (Plaintiffs use); id. at 136 (Defendant's use).
103. See id. at 71 (Plaintiffs case); id. at 149-50 (Defendant's case).
104. Patric v. Harris Video Clip, available at http://www.law.suffolk.edu/
faculty/directories/faculty.cfmr?InstructorID=819 [hereinafter Video Clip]. The relevant
portion of the video is very short (approximately three minutes), beginning at 2:32:48 and
ending at approximately 2:35:54.
105. See id.
106. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 43-67, 94-122, 132-161.
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The focus, angle, and sound of the film render it particularly
unclear; but all films give rise to problems of clarity, which translate
into problems of interpretation. All films can be cast in an ambiguous
light when the evaluator considers the categories of film form that
shape film's meaning.10 7 This film lends itself to a straightforward
critique because of its obvious ambiguity. Nonetheless, the
examination techniques discussed below are useful for all sorts of
films. These techniques prove especially helpful in the context of
cross-examining films that appear to tell only one story when in fact,
like all films, they tell more than one story and less than the whole
story.
A. The Threshold Question: Admit or Exclude?
1. Admission
Lawyers faced with filmic evidence that appears to help their
case must first ask whether the film should be used at all. Patric had a
fairly good case against the police without the film. The central
witness against him was a police officer whose credibility could be
impeached with evidence that he had previously lied to his superior
officers. 108 Although juries are often unwilling to render a judgment
against a police officer, 10 9 Patric's lawyer deftly handled both the
deposition and trial when he asked the arresting officer to explain the
responsibility that the police have to the community. 110 At both
opportunities, the officer stated that the police should be held
accountable to Patric and the community to uphold the law."II In other
words, the police officer himself gave the jury permission to find him
responsible for Patric's injuries should the jury determine that Patric's
arrest was unlawful. Patric also had many witnesses-friends and
acquaintances who were at the scene-who would testify that the
107. See supra Part I.B.
108. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 4.
109. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 468 (2004) ("Judges and juries (and most ordinary citizens) view police
officers as public servants who work under difficult, dangerous, and uncertain conditions to
maintain the 'thin blue line' between order and chaos."); see also Scott Turow, Why the Diallo
Verdict Isn't Surprising, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2000, at 22, reprinted in POLICE BRUTALITY
189 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., Greenhaven Press 2004) (stating that "when a police officer is
trying to do what he's been sworn to do, which is to corral bad guys, even if he has gone about
it overzealously or stupidly, juries often refuse to convict.")
110. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 9-10.
11. Id.
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police mishandled the situation. 112 Finally, the case seemed to turn on
whether the officer actually said, "You're under arrest."' 13 The film is
silent on that point because of the poor sound quality, so the film does
not help or hurt Patric's case on this point. With all of this evidence,
why show the film at all?
One possible problem for Patric at trial could be the jury's
perception or expectation of his ego. Since Patric is a Hollywood
actor, 114 the jury might perceive him as entitled or cocky, and the film
does not negate that perception. It shows Patric sashaying down the
street, shirt open, cuffs undone, hanging out with friends. In this way,
the film might be "too complete." It may do some good for Patric-
perhaps it tends to lend credibility to the idea that Patric was not so
drunk that he was a danger to himself or others-but it also contains
images that might damage Patric's case. These would be viable
reasons for Patric's defense team to not use the film at all. However,
that choice runs against the grain because film is an enticing litigation
tool. This is part of the challenge with filmic evidence: deciding when
to forego its captivating qualities precisely because those qualities
might be used against the client.
Patric's lawyer fell prey to the film's lure and used it on direct
examination to help Patric explain the event in question.' Patric's
lawyer then asked leading questions of his witness such as, "I am
going to start [the video] up again. What I want you to watch for is
stepping up. Did you step up?" and "[W]e saw on the video.., an
officer behind you pushing you down to the ground... [W]e're at
2:34:16 and you've been thrown to the ground, correct?" 116 These
questions elucidated points on which the film is not sufficiently clear
and for which the plaintiff carried the burden of proof.1 17 However,
Patric's testimony on these crucial issues was not persuasive because
112. Patric v. City of Austin, Docket No. 60 (Combined Witness and Exhibit List from
Jury Trial). See also Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 56 (listing Patric's
witnesses).
113. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note l01,at 55-56.
114. Imdb.com, Jason Patric-filmography, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0O00574/.
115. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 102.
116. Id. at 106, 112-13.
117. Claims that police officers used excessive force during an arrest are analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 2003). The
plaintiff must show (1) an injury (2) that resulted directly and solely from the use of force that
was clearly excessive to the need, and (3) the excessiveness must have been objectively
unreasonable. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Bryant v. Muth,
994 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Once the defendant raises a qualified immunity
defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the defendant's alleged conduct
violated the law...").
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the film tended to weaken the otherwise strong testimonial evidence in
Patric's case. The film did not contradict the testimony, but it
nevertheless weakened Patric's case because it was not dispositive one
way or another. Because viewers expect film to be clear, when it is
unclear, many viewers might undervalue other reliable evidence that
tends to prove the very thing the person offering the film as additional
evidence hoped the film would substantiate.
The centerpiece of most personal injury and constitutional tort
cases is the direct examination of the plaintiff or plaintiffs. The direct
examination provides a unique opportunity for plaintiffs to tell their
story in their own words. Additionally, it presents the best opportunity
for juries to appreciate what the plaintiffs claim they were subjected to
and felt at each stage of the incident. By avoiding leading questions
and maintaining a low profile, lawyers conducting direct examinations
enable plaintiffs to share their experiences with the jurors in a direct,
unmediated manner. If at all possible, it is important for plaintiffs to be
likable and for jurors to feel the plaintiff's humanity. When the
plaintiff is a professional actor, the chances of establishing this
necessary rapport with jurors would likely be enhanced. Film,
however, can easily overshadow the plaintiff as a witness, especially if
the plaintiff is the star of the film, as was the case in Patric. Arguably,
playing the film in the Patric case detracted from Jason Patric's
presence and capacity as a witness on his own behalf. Not offering the
film as evidence might have given Patric a better chance of being an
effective witness.
Using the film of the incident during Patric's direct
examination made it extremely difficult to achieve the desired results.
First, the lawyer conducting the examination kept inserting himself
into the testimony as he called attention to specific sections of the
video." 8 Second, because of the incomplete and ambiguous nature of
this film, the struggle to relate Patric's account of the incident to the
film was distracting. Patric's lawyer repeatedly attempted to
demonstrate that the film corroborated the plaintiffs testimony. 119 As
a result, the examination was chopped up and lacked the fluency that
recounting a powerful and persuasive narrative requires. As a witness,
Patric spent too much time trying to explain the film, rather than
telling his story. In a different case, with more explicit images and a
more dramatic visual narrative, a film might be helpful in augmenting
the testimonial narrative. One can imagine showing a video of a
118. See Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 102, 103, 106, 113, 121.
119. Id.
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dramatic incident and then asking the plaintiff a simple non-leading
question that would allow him to add something to the film, injecting
the event with emotions not apparent on film. For example, an attorney
might ask: "How did you feel while that was happening to you?"
However, as discussed above, even with an unusually clear film, it is
probably better to leave detailed explanations of how the film
corroborates the plaintiffs story to argument, rather than trying to
interweave them with the direct examination of the plaintiff.
2. Exclusion
Lawyers can challenge the admissibility of film evidence just
like other types of evidence. If the evidence is admitted, lawyers can
then challenge the weight that it should be afforded. For example, the
opponent to the admission of evidence may argue that the film's
prejudicial qualities may mislead the jury. 120 Alternatively, the
opponent may frame objections to the admission of evidence based on
the authentication doctrine and argue that the film cannot be
authenticated as depicting what it purports to show.12 1 However, as
long as there is a subscribing witness who testifies that the film is a
fair and accurate representation of what it purports to show, challenges
to admissibility are not likely to be successful under this doctrine.1
22
Nonetheless, the opponent may choose to raise issues about what "fair
and accurate" means with respect to film at the admissibility stage,
especially in light of the partiality and bias inherent in all film. Even if
the judge admits the evidence, well supported objections can educate
the court about weaknesses in the film that otherwise may not have
been apparent. 1
23
For instance, in Scott v. Harris,124 it might have been helpful if
the plaintiffs attorney had primed the trial judge to think critically
about the biases inherent in film before the judge decided the issue as a
matter of law based on the film alone. 125 Moreover, a hearing on a pre-
trial motion to exclude or strike the filmic evidence provides
opponents with the opportunity to question the subscribing witness and
obtain information about the circumstances under which the film was
120. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
121. See FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
122. This tends to be a low hurdle. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 9.14, 1020-1021 (3d ed. 2003).
123. For a discussion on the weaknesses inherent in filmic evidence, see infra Part I.B.
124. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
125. See id. at 1776 (holding that the lower court erred in not viewing "the facts in the
light depicted by the videotape").
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made. This might provide useful ammunition when contesting the
weight of the filmic evidence before the jury.
B. The Limits of the Film 's Frame
If an attorney plans to use a film or loses a motion to suppress
and must face an opponent's use of a persuasive film, what is the next
step? How can lawyers recast the film in terms of its partiality and
bias, thereby questioning the film's point of view? How can lawyers
use the other stories the film might tell, thereby harnessing its
ambiguity?
Consider first the film's frame: what is visible in the film and
what is not, due to its beginning, ending, and spatial attributes-its
borders, its point of view and its mechanical capacity. Despite film's
realistic representational capacity, it does not capture much of the real
event that is still relevant to the case at hand. Alluding to the limited
scope of the film's representation may effectively undermine the
film's apparent completeness. It will also highlight the differences
between how the film makes sense of the event being adjudicated and
how the trial, with all the other evidence, makes sense of that same
event.
For example, in Patric, the film of the plaintiffs arrest tells us
nothing about whether Patric smelled of alcohol. Smell is probative of
the police's lawful behavior and this film (or any film) would not
capture this kind of real evidence. Similarly, the film tells us nothing
about how many beers Patric consumed or whether he stumbled out of
the bar or left steadily. Viewers can only imagine what went on before
Patric and his friends tried to hail a cab, and these events may or may
not be relevant to the issues in dispute in the case. Indeed, any number
of facts that are not caught on film could change how the event is
interpreted. Lawyers should challenge themselves to come up with
facts that are not present in the film that they can use to reinterpret the
facts that are in the film. This exercise can undermine the story that the
film appears to be telling.' 26
In the Patric case, the film's point of view was not optimal.
Mounted on a police car and running automatically, the film failed to
126. In the case of a filmed confession, for example, knowing how long a suspect has
been held in custody prior to being interrogated and prior to his confession being filmed would
influence a determination regarding the voluntary nature of his confession. Likewise, although
a defendant might appear comfortable in an interrogation room, the film does not reveal the
temperature in the room. Sweat or shivers from the defendant could indicate a mental state or
simply a response to extreme heat or cold undetectable by the camera.
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capture relevant portions of the event because a parked car blocked its
vantage. 27 The film did not show the curb, yet, whether Patric was on
or off the curb in response to the officer's request was crucial to the
plaintiff's case. 2 8 When watching the film, viewers must strain to see
this relevant detail, but the film is uncooperative. 12 9 No matter how
much viewers look, they won't see past the parked car blocking the
view. Recognizing the film's silence on important facts undermines its
status as comprehensive and complete.'
30
C. Ambiguity in Film Images
In addition to considering what is off-camera or invisible to the
camera, a lawyer faced with filmic evidence should also evaluate
whether there is a lack of clarity in what the camera does show. This
lack of clarity can occur in at least two ways: (1) literally unclear,
meaning the film is out of focus; or (2) narratively unclear, meaning
the film is ambiguous as to its significance to the issues in dispute at
trial.
1. Literally Unclear
Pointing to the film's lack of visual clarity is one of the easiest
and most obvious ways to undermine the film's perceived
transparency. Most examples of evidence verit6 are bad quality
films--out of focus, shot from a distance, and of poor sound and color
quality. Emphasizing that key moments in the film are actually quite
difficult to see or hear will weaken the film's force as evidence.
For example, Patric accused the officers of throwing him to the
ground with unreasonable force and slamming his head on the
concrete. 13' The film shows someone in a white shirt falling down-
Patric says that it is him-but the film does not show him hitting the
sidewalk. 132 The film shows police rushing to the scene, as if
127. See Video Clip supra note 104, at 2:33-2:35.
128. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 44-45, 53-55, 104-06.
129. Id. at 44-45.
130. For a drastic example of problems with film framing, see the police video
documenting the beating and arrest of Nathanial Jones, discussed supra note 34. Most of the
beating took place off-screen although the sound quality is quite good. Where one does not see
the reception of pain and only hears the words of the police and criminal suspect, the
appearance of brutality can be minimized merely by its visual absence. I am grateful to my
former student Michael Kaplan for this insight.
131. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at para. 12, Patric v. Austin, No. A-05-CA-
022-AWA, 2006 WL 5266759, slip op. (W.D. Tex. August 22, 2005).
132. Video Clip, supra note 104, at 2:35.
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something startling was occurring, which suggests that whatever was
occurring might have been violent or require police back-up.'33 But
from the film, it is impossible to discern how Patric hit the ground,
whether it was accidental or intentional, and whether it was done with
unreasonable force-or with any force at all. Also, the officers accused
Patric of walking away when they allegedly said, "You're under
arrest. ' 34 But the film's sound quality is poor because the camera was
positioned far from the incident and its microphone was weak. We,
therefore, cannot hear whether the officer actually said the words,
"You're under arrest," a fact on which much of the defense's case
rested. 13
5
2. Narratively Unclear
Although the film is literally unclear in many places, it does
show Patric shaking his arm loose from the officer's grasp and taking a
few steps away from the officers. Indeed, the film buttresses testimony
from both the arresting officer and from Patric that Patric shook his
arm loose. 136 This is not a disputed fact. What is disputed is the
significance of this movement-again, a point the film cannot answer.
Patric calls his movements "a reflexive response" to the officers'
abrupt move to grab him.' 37 The officers interpret Patric's movement
as pushing them away, shrugging them off and resisting arrest.1 38 As
such, the officers assert that they merely responded with appropriate
force to put Patric under their control.139
Patric's arm movement-a fact of the film-is narratively
ambiguous because of its differing significance in the competing
stories told at trial. One story was about an instinctive response to
force and the power of the police. Patric says he took a step away to
diffuse the situation, contending that the police picked him out of the
crowd as the "alpha dog" in order to take him down and teach him and
his friends not to disobey or disrespect the police. 140 The police told a
different story. They said they heard Patric say "fucking pigs, fucking
fascists" as he moved from the crosswalk toward the curb.'14 Again,
we don't hear this on the film. However, the police claim that Patric's
133. Id.
134. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 55-57.
135. Id. at 56.
136. Id. at 150.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 59-61, 71.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 133-34.
141. Id. at43, 107.
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aggressive language led them to suspect that Patric was out -of
control. 142 When Patric moved away from the police officer and waved
his arm, the police described this movement as an affmnative push, at
which time the officers tried to restrain Patrick's arm, put him in a
headlock and handcuff him. 1
43
The "alpha dog, police-humiliation" story that the plaintiff told
was juxtaposed with the "drunk and out-of-control crowd" story that
the defendants told. 144 These are the two dominant narratives spun
during the trial. Both parties relied on the film to ground their stories
and provide illustrations of their tales. But the film itself does not
confirm or deny the truth of these narratives. The film does not explain
whether the police used unreasonable force or unlawfully arrested
Patric. The significance of the facts shown on film is ambiguous until
they are strung together in a story-the story that is provided by the
attorneys' advocacy and other testimonial evidence-but not by the
film's content. 145 This case illustrates the difficulty of relying on film
as a guaranteed way to discover the one true story. Advocates use film
to put their story in the best possible light, trying to exploit what is
perceived as the film's clarity and objectivity. Yet, in Patric, the battle
over the film's determinacy only highlighted the relative weaknesses
of each side's story and the indeterminacy of the film.146
III. METHOD OF CROSS-EXAMINING FILM
Obviously, a lawyer cannot literally cross-examine a film;
rather, a lawyer either examines or cross-examines a witness about the
film in evidence. The examination is a "cross-examination" of film
because it aims to fortify or destabilize the dominant story the film
appears to be telling. The examination seeks to accomplish this by
142. Id. at 58-59.
143. Id. at 59-61.
144. See generally id. passim.
145. See HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 14, 19-20 (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1987)
(discussing the moralizing role of narrative on historical or factual discourse).
146. See Duffett, supra note 57. This article describes a case where the father of a
deceased soldier sued members of Topeka's Westboro Baptist Church who protested at his
son's funeral. Plaintiff's attorneys used film footage offered by the defendant to help prove
the plaintiffs claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded the
plaintiff nearly $11 million. The plaintiff's attorney exclaimed that the video was "like a
Christmas gift" because the defendant submitted the videos; therefore, the plaintiff was free to
use them to support his own arguments. Furthermore, the videos showed the church's actions
with inside access that an outside party could never replicate. The plaintiffs attorney stated: "I
don't care how good of a lawyer you are, you cannot articulate this yourself." Id.
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attacking either the story that the film seems to tell through its
representation of reality, or the story that a witness on the stand
narrates. Below are two methods for conducting this cross-
examination that harness the concepts about film form, including
framing and ambiguity, discussed above. Again, the film at the center
of Patric v. Austin is used as an example.
A. Lock in Testimony and Contrast Film
In Patric v. Austin, the usefulness of the film on direct
examination is questionable for the reasons discussed above, but
Patric's attorneys could have used the film more effectively when
cross-examining the arresting police officer. The officer's story centers
on a few key facts: Patric's eyes were glassy, he swore, stood in the
street contrary to the officer's command, smelled of alcohol, resisted
arrest, and pushed the police officer with his arm. 14 7 If the officer
includes all of these facts in his testimony, an attorney writing them on
a white board in front of the jury could effectively lock the officer into
these factual assertions. Then, upon playing the film to the jury, the
attorney could ask the officer to show the jury which parts of the film
confirm these elements and, therefore, confirm his testimony as well.
The officer would not be able to do it. None of these things are in the
film, visibly or audibly.
This method does not prove the officer a liar; but, along with
the fact that the officer had been disciplined for lying the past, 14 it
does taint some of the strongest evidence against Patric-the officer's
testimonial evidence. This cross-examination relies on the assumption
that the film would tend to reveal those essential facts necessary to
find a fair and truthful result. It also effectively undermines the
clarifying role of film and shifts the focus from the film as conclusive
proof to other forms of evidence that may be more reliable and less
prejudicial.
B. Exploit Filmic Fragments
Lawyers may also cross-examine film by exploiting its inherent
partiality. For example, Patric's attorneys might have shown the film
in its entirety to buttress his case and show that he and his friends were
not particularly loud, were not blocking the street in any significant
147. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 43, 50, 52, 56, 59.
148. Id. at 4-5.
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way, and that Patric appeared to respond to the police officer's
command to return to the sidewalk. In that case, opposing counsel
could then exploit the film's ambiguity by pointing to its fragmentary
nature and its conjuring capacity.
To undermine Patric's story, an attorney could replay certain
parts of the film that are particularly unfavorable to Patric. For
example, an attorney might replay for the jury the part of the film
where one of Patric's friends repeats over and over: "He didn't mean it
officer. He apologizes, please officer, let him go, he's sorry. ' 149 Here,
the film fragment is significant. Without an explanation from this
person to give context to that statement, it seems that Patric's friend
confirmed that Patric did something he should not have, perhaps
swearing at the officer or resisting arrest. The defense attorney could
play the film and then ask, "Mr. Patric, can you explain why your
friend apologized for your behavior?" or, "Mr. Patric, isn't it true that
your friend appears to be saying that you did something for which you
should be sorry?"
Many of the statements contained in the film would be
inadmissible hearsay if offered for their truth. 150 As such, they should
be redacted by splicing the film or editing out the sound. But if Patric
admitted the film in its entirety in his case in chief, he presumably
waived that objection. 151 His opponent should, therefore, be free to use
those statements in his defense. Doing so could effectively exploit the
contradictory aspects of film: its inherently fragmentary nature, its
partiality, and its perceived comprehensiveness-the myth that it
shows the whole story.1 52 The puzzle from Patric's angle is that he
presumably sought to admit the entire film on the premise that
admitting it in full would avoid the problem of appearing to distort the
truth by showing fragments without providing a context.' 5 ' But
admitting the whole film meant that those unfavorable aspects of the
film, such as Patric's friend's apology, were not edited out. 154 Given
the persuasive power of film, these negative aspects become
practically impossible to rebut.
149. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 118, 160. See also Video Clip, supra
note 104, at 2:34-2:35.
150. FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that doctrine of invited error precluded review of a claim that the admission of testimony
violated the hearsay rule when the party's counsel elicited the testimony at trial).
152. See infra Part II.
153. See FED. R. EvID. 106.
154. This is the situation absent a successful FED. R. EVID. 105 objection with an effective
jury instruction.
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A film may also conjure memories or recall facts that would
not otherwise be recoverable. The attorney for the defense in this case
might have harnessed this film's conjuring capacity by replaying
certain film fragments. For example, at a point later in this film when
Patric arrived at the police station for booking and was standing
outside the police cruiser, we hear (but do not see) an officer say to
Patric "I don't know why you're staring me down?"'' 55 At trial, Patric
hears the words on the film but says he does not recall the incident and
does not remember staring down a police officer.' 56 The officer's
statement is hearsay if offered to prove Patric was staring at him, but is
within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule,' 57 an
exception that is likely to arise frequently when dealing with evidence
verite,
By playing this conjuring fragment for the jury, the film acts as
a "silent witness," effectively testifying to the truth of an event-in
this case Patric's allegedly hostile behavior-that no one can verify.
159
This film fragment conjures an image of Patric facing off with the
officer, which lends credibility to the officer's story that Patric was
belligerent. Using it to cross-examine Patric would exploit the film's
ambiguity to the defendant's benefit by asking Patric to clarify the
statement. Though the statement is unmoored from any human
witness, its filmic incarnation, emphasized by the cross-examination
question, taints the case against Patric.
These two examples of the use of film fragments should
encourage attorneys to think twice about admitting a film into
evidence in its entirety. To the extent possible counsel may attempt to
edit all evidence veritW with an eye to redacting those portions that may
be used against a client in the ways discussed above.' 60 An inevitable
objection to the edited version will be that the film's unique
relationship to the event-its witnessing function- has been distorted
by attorney advocacy. The benefit of film is that it captures an event
155. Patric v. Austin Transcript, supra note 101, at 157.
156. Id.
157. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
158. Evidence verit of this nature records altercations, so it would routinely contain
verbal reactions to the event, which would comfortably fit within the present sense impression
or the excited utterance exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) and (2).
159. For a discussion of the silent witness theory, see supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
160. It is proper to redact portions of a film that contain inadmissible material, such as
hearsay that does not fall under an exception. A party will not, however, be able to delete
material simply because it is unfavorable if the opponent insists upon its inclusion. These
matters should be addressed prior to trial in a motion in limine so that counsel knows from the
outset which portions of the film the jury is going to see.
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without distortion and bias. But, as discussed above, all film distorts
the real event. Film of an event is but a slice of that occurrence; it is
necessarily partial and, therefore, no more immune to critical analysis
regarding prejudice and probative value than any other documentary or
testimonial proffer. 16 1 If, however, the whole film is admitted, whether
over objection or not, the above methods of cross-examination can
help turn the film's qualities to the advantage of the attorney who
might have opposed its admission in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evidence verit in Patric v. Austin is a perfect example of
how any film, when used assertively to adjudicate a case, presents the
problem of ambiguity and partiality. 162 Each subsequent viewing of
this film merely decreases viewers' certainty of what they are seeing.
This case illustrates the myth of film as the best evidence of "what
happened" because it is not the best evidence of anything relevant to
the issues at the Patric trial. An effective examination of the film
would have shifted the focus of the trial to all the other evidence
marshaled by the parties, most of which had more probative value than
the film itself.1
63
One could ask the same questions and apply the same tools to a
film that appears much less ambiguous or partial, like a filmed
criminal confession, the film of the police chase in Scott v. Harris, or a
surveillance film that appears to fully corroborate one side-for
example, the film at the center of the Rodney King case. 164 Faced with
filmic evidence, a lawyer should ask:
* Should I use the film at all? Does it present the paradox of
providing context but also containing prejudicial
statements? Is there other evidence that would be as or
more persuasive, keeping in mind that film, when analyzed
161. An attorney particularly concerned with how a film was edited can use discovery
requests to learn exactly which portions were edited and how. This would enable the opposing
attorney to reconstruct the film and evaluate how the film was re-narrativized and to what
extent the re-narrativization requires a rejoinder. For a related example of this practice, see
Duffett, supra note 57.
162. See supra Parts 1I and II1.
163. See supra Part Ii.
164. Seth Mydans, Police Verdict: Los Angeles Police Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y.
TIMES, April 30, 1992, at Al available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE3DE 163DF933A05757COA964958260. See also BILL NICHOLS,
BLURRED BOUNDARIES: QUESTIONS OF MEANING IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 17-42 (Indiana
University Press 1994) (discussing the use of film at the trial of Rodney King).
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by someone with skill, can be turned around to mean
something entirely different?
* What is and is not in the film that might be relevant? Which
facts would make a difference to the interpretation of the
film that are absent from the film but that could have been
present had the film been framed differently?
" What is unclear in the film, either out of focus or
narratively ambiguous? How might I put pressure on these
points of ambiguity to tell an alternative story to the one
my adversary is telling?
* Can I undermine the film's dispositive nature by comparing
witness testimony to the film's images?
* Can I exploit the ambiguity of film fragments and film's
conjuring capacity by asking leading questions on cross-
examination, thereby animating filmic images and sound-
bites that might otherwise be overlooked or forgotten?
All of these tools focus on the problems of storytelling and the
inevitability of competing narratives that might create a structure for a
set of facts. In Scott v. Harris, only one Justice determined that the
ambiguity in the film was sufficient to necessitate sending the case to a
jury. 65 It would be difficult at this stage to know whether a more
robust record-based on aggressive motion practice contesting the bias
and meaning of the film as evidence of the chase-would have
avoided the summary judgment decision. But it certainly would have
primed the fact-finders and any appellate court to view the evidentiary
value of the film in a more limited way. Attorneys who can
successfully pose and answer the questions above will be more
persuasive on their client's behalf, especially in light of film's
dominant story-telling role in our contemporary culture. The value of a
narrative lies not only its cohering effect in the hands of a skilled
attorney, but in its inevitable multiplicity.' 66 There is always already
more than one story to be told. 167 This is the reason for trials and the
judicial system in the first place. Finding the alternative stories that the
film tells or could have told will go a long way toward demystifying
the marked effect of filmic evidence and furthering the promise that
law will deliver meaningful due process and justice.
165. 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7
CRITICAL INQUIRY 5 (1980).
167. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories, 7 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 213 (1980).
